Karl Popper--Falsification (Philosophy of Science)

As Popper notes it, “every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or to refute it.” [1] Popper’s continual conjectures and refutations clearly deny any induction as part of scientific method. This is not an entirely jointed theory, yet it makes sense. Popper is not trying to exonerate induction in the scientific method; rather he completely eliminates it while he clarifies the scientific method: “Popper, then, repudiates induction, and rejects the view that it is the characteristic method of scientific investigation and inference and substitutes falsifiability in its place.” [2] He believes that theories are always falsified at a later date. Moreover, he argues that “theories [Marx’s, Freud’s, or Adler’s] appeared to be able to explain practically everything that happened within the fields to which they referred.” [3] But this, in his opinion, is not enough for them to be called genuine. Popper thinks that in every step of the way, these theories find verifications and this in fact, is their weakness. He calls these theories “non-scientific” because they are not disproved or proven erroneous: “A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory but a vice.” [4] On the other hand, scientists might argue that the best scientific theories are the ones that have multifarious verifications and confirmations. Maybe there are no vehement validations or verifications in science but there are some confirmations. In this essay, I will argue that Popper’s theory of falsification is tenable and is skillfully evasive; it is not another hollow conception of disproving theories but a genuine argument against verification.

We are getting closer to the truth as Popper asserts, but what is the so-called truth? How are we getting closer to the truth? At this instant Popper presents his idea of falsifiability. Popper’s notion of verisimilitude is a somewhat hazy and entertaining conception, yet when viewed with care it makes more sense and supports falsification. As noted in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Popper argues that “A ‘good’ scientific theory has a higher level of verisimilitude than its rivals, and he explicated this concept by reference to the logical consequences of theories.” [5] This idea mirrors the mutations in the standards, contrary to which we appraise the feats of the past. Popper’s definition of verisimilitude seems to necessitate the habitual pertinence of mathematical and valid (logical) systematic procedures, which are for many scientists the paragons of external reality. The idea of verisimilitude is not an objective idea; however, general notions of verisimilitude are suitable in scientific applications because they, in fact, raise the applications’ genuine status by hiding assessed aims, concealing themselves in the shadows of antecedent operations. Social sciences are well-acquainted with this plight when innate evaluations are conceded to disguise the end results of logical or mathematical computations. If supposed that verisimilitude of scientific theories are deliberated plainly by a collection of comprehensible genuine outcomes rather by a collection of false outcomes, then any given scientist could augment the verisimilitude in his theories in every step of the way and assumingly innovate science by heedlessly iterating the experiments that are only “corroborated.”

Popper’s critique of Karl Marx’s theory of history, as its “predictions were testable, and in fact falsified.” He argues that the theory is weak because most of the time it was confirmed. [6] What makes it falsifiable? Moreover, Popper asserts that the theory is saved by ad hoc, and “in this way they rescued the theory from refutation.” [7] Likely, Popper is correct. Today, capitalism has expanded the impoverishes of the class of workers and the exploited so quickly that they are strained to make changes and revolutions just to stay alive. These social classes are perpetually positioned in opposition to each other, and the classes are inclined to preponderate; whose standards would be met maximally within the claims of production. Popper argues that Marx’s theory of history is not scientific; moreover, it is scientific only by moral excellence of the determinism of its phantasm. It inclines to ascribe societal mutations to the active directions of social construction.

An example of a theory that has been falsified, which confirms Popper’s falsification, is Kepler’s laws. His three planetary laws state that “every planet travels round the sun in an elliptical orbit, with the sun at one focus. The moon, in the same way, travels in an ellipse round the earth, though in this case he recognized that the ellipse was not perfect.” [8] It is not to oppose that Kepler’s law of planetary motion is not an astounding discovery, yet the laws are proven to be factually erroneous. Kepler’s second law asserts, “The velocity of a planet varies with its distance from the sun in such a way that a line joining the planet with the sun sweeps out equal areas in equal times.” [9] These laws are mere approximations and the uncovering of Kepler’s principles and regulations established a requisite step in an advocating research of science that preceded generously confirmed Newton’s theory from which an altered version of the Kepler’s laws was attained. Kepler’s third law states that “The square of the time taken by any planet to make a complete orbit is proportional to the cube of its mean distance from the sun.” [10] A discovery of untenable principles such as Kepler’s come out to be important in the scientific progress, yet they are still falsified, confirming Popper’s notion of falsification. Popper might assert that theories like this one may have some confirmations or truth content, yet it is not falsified at a later date. It seems like the theory was like creating a mirage, which is illusionary, a fake.

A true theory aggregates to the acquiring of a novel entry of noesis, not just coming across with a fresh target without distinguishing that phenomenon or understanding its importance. Kepler has not realized what he had discovered. Later his theories have been falsified by Newton in regards to the planetary system. Kepler’s first two laws were results of mere observations. “Kepler regarded them as mathematically equivalent, although in fact they are not; the inverse distance law is a good approximation for ellipses of small eccentricity, but is not exact.” [11] It is clear that Newton might have derived from Kepler’s laws to come up with his theory; however, he does not seem to have relied on Kepler’s laws for an explicit empirical substance. When ellipse was accepted by many astronomers, Newton did not identify that the pragmatic ascertainment did not give assurance of an elliptical model. This makes it prominent that Newton falsified Kepler’s laws, which proves Popper’s falsification as genuine. “[Some astronomers] who accepted Kepler's first law with enthusiasm, nevertheless rejected the second and substituted some simpler but less accurate alternative.” [12] They rejected it because the falsity content is higher than the truth content is lower. It is the opposite of verisimilitude.

On Kepler’s first law Newton is considering the area law, utilized to the principal planets merely as a very estimative empirical content. “Newton showed that the area law was derivable from a much simpler and more ultimate set of exact mathematical laws. Even those who accepted the area law in principle often used simpler but less accurate variants in practice.” [13] Newton is not affirming a fixed pragmatic verification of the area rule by Kepler or any scientist, but instead he is requesting us to view the planetary system in a universal and qualitative mode. Newton’s laws are utilized to attain derivative equations for the shifted magnitude and direction from the sun to for instance, Venus or any planet. Then it is displayed that the shifted magnitude and direction are sited in a plane for instance, if the base end is moved without rotation to the point of derivation; the base point sums up the elements as an ellipse.

As Newton states, the number Kepler gives in his Rudolphine Tables for the mean radius of Saturn's orbit, namely 9.51 semidiame-ters of the Earth's orbit, is smaller than the third Keplerian rule would require; with the commonly accepted values for the Earth's and Saturn's periods, the number should be more nearly 9.54. Newton suggests that the error may derive from Jupiter's action on Saturn, and he further gives a rough estimate of the effect he expects.[14]

It is an instant effect of Newton’s laws that the middle point of two entities with their

gravity may succor as the root of an inertial coordinate system. Kepler’s laws do not apply Newton’s Laws or vice versa. Newton did not rely on Kepler’s laws to come up with his Laws. Nevertheless, he falsified Kepler’s laws in his reasoning. Newton’s onset point was the dynamical laws engaging influences of cosmic bodies that decide the orbits of planets. Newton’s theories are different than of Kepler’s laws. Kepler’s determine that if anyone has such laws then it is of great certainty. Popper, here, would argue that this kind of verification is what makes that theory weak or even he might call it “non-scientific.” These kinds of confirmations are what make a theory not genuine: “ Every genuine test of a scientific theory, then, is logically an attempt to refute or to falsify it, and one genuine counter-instance falsifies the whole theory.” [15] Moreover, Popper thinks that theories that put themselves at a greater risk of being refuted are genuine.

Popper’s notion of falsification is tenable at every instance because what makes sense in this paradigm will not be sane in another. As Dr. McHenry puts it, “Verification of scientific knowledge is replaced by falsification. Accumulation of irrefutable facts is replaced by conjecture and refutation.” [16] If there is truth content in a theory, Popper asserts, it has to be marked as false. It is easy to obtain confirmations and verification, says Popper, looking for verifications will work at best if theories are found as mistaken and later replaced by “better” ones. Kepler when introduced his first law, then the third; he applied some modifications later. Kepler, himself, at some point falsified his own theories, proving Popper’s falsification notion. The acceptance of a new thesis lies in the idea whether or not it can e confirmed successfully having steady empirical grounds. The interest for Popper is not so much in confirming a theory; rather falsifying it. Popper’s theory of falsification is very much compatible with actual scientific practice. Nevertheless, is prone to serious questioning especially by physicists. Regarding the basis of the falsification measure by Popper; it is furnished on the proposal that general laws are epistemologically obscure in the consideration of the enigma of inductive illation. A neat give-and take on a scientific theory will seek to show that the conception of scientific theory as interpreted by a physicist, for instance, is at divergence with that articulated by Popper. Popper argues that general (universal) notions are not forthright accounts because they cannot be logically vindicated. Yet they may be genuinely falsified. Popper brings up a seemingly perfect example to justify his approach:

The empirical basis of objective science has thus nothing ‘absolute’ about it. Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or ‘given’ base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being. (qtd. in McHenry)

Popper’s “customary” approach is what makes him distinguishable among other philosophers. His one idea-the idea of falsification is a genuine statement.

Bibliography

McHenry, Leemon. “Popper and Maxwell on Scientific Progress,”

<http://www.csun.edu/~lmchenry/PopperandMaxwellonScientificProgress.html>.

Popper, Karl R. “Science: Conjectures and Refutations,” Readings in the Philosophy of

Science, edited by Theodore Schick, Jr., 9-13. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Company, 2000.

Thomton, Stephen. "Karl Popper", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

.

Russell, J.L. “Kepler’s Laws of Planetary Motion: 1609-1666.” The British Journal for

the History of Science. Vol. 2, No. 1 (Jun., 1964): 1-24.

Wilson, Curtis “Newton and Some Philosopher’s on Kepler’s ‘Laws,” Journal of

the History of Ideas. Vol. 35, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1974): 231-258.

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[1] Karl R. Popper, “Science: Conjectures and Refutations,” Readings in the Philosophy of Science (Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Company, 2000), 11.

[2] Stephen Thomton, "Karl Popper", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .

[3]Karl R. Popper, “Science: Conjectures and Refutations,” 10.

[4] Karl R. Popper, “Science: Conjectures and Refutations,” 10.

[5] Stephen Thomton, "Karl Popper", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .

[6] Karl R. Popper, “Science: Conjectures and Refutations,” 12.

[7] Karl R. Popper, “Science: Conjectures and Refutations,” 12.

[8] J. L. Russell, “Kepler’s Laws of Planetary Motion: 1609-1666”, The British Journal for the History of Science, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Jun., 1964): 2.

[9] J. L. Russell, “Kepler’s Laws of Planetary Motion,” 2.

[10] J. L. Russell, “Kepler’s Laws of Planetary Motion,” 2.

[11] J. L. Russell, “Kepler’s Laws of Planetary Motion,” 3.

[12] J. L. Russell, “Kepler’s Laws of Planetary Motion,” 3.

[13] J. L.”Russell, Kepler’s Laws of Planetary Motion,” 3-4.

[14] Curtis Wilson, “Newton and Some Philosopher’s on Kepler’s ‘Laws,” Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1974): 231.

[15] Stephen Thomton, "Karl Popper", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .

[16] Leemon McHenry, “Popper and Maxwell on Scientific Porgress,” < http://www.csun.edu/~lmchenry/PopperandMaxwellonScientificProgress.html>.