The Fabled Sector--Hollywood Boulevard (mere observation)

It is January 19, 2011, about 5:00 in the evening. The sun has almost set, and the blazing lights around the letters of El Capitan Theatre are just one of the many things I spot among the classic Hollywood attractions and structures, stores harkening to a bygone era of Hollywood glitz and glamour. As I continue my walk, I notice the Masonic Temple with its Neo-classical design. The light turns green. As long as I see the “WALK” sign, I venture forth to the other side, to the cradle of our modern pop culture: the Hollywood Walk of Fame. There are bronze star-plaques, embedded in pink and obsidian terrazzo squares embodying names such as Walt Disney, Gene Autry, Bob Barker, Walter Lantz, Marilyn Monroe, Mickey Mouse, and perhaps hundreds more I walk on or by. A man with braided hair sits on an upside down white bucket, in front of Grauman’s Chinese Theatre. He creates music or consistent sounds by hitting on the two other white buckets or “drums” with two sticks. The tension and frequency increase as he gets compliments or attention, reducing the amplitude of the sound. The edges of the sidewalk are not concluded with the drummer, but my eye catches a variety of superheroes, movie characters, and villains, who add to the buzz of the already crowded sidewalk, ready to entertain and be entertained. My walk ends where it started, at the El-Capitan, rising high in the “moderne” style. There is a crowd, mostly consisting of Latinos, gathered together in front of the Theatre. There are a few cameramen, some with microphones, two police officers, and several orange-vested organizers as factions of the multitude. Adults, as well as many kids chant: “Disney, Disney stop the greed! Listen to our family’s need!” Most of these protestors hold candles, and some hold each others’ hands or their children. Almost all the children carry some kind of a Disney toy. A man speaks on behalf of others in regards to Disney making health insurance unaffordable for them. Some of the kids get to the podium and express themselves in short, yet striking sentences: “They don’t like us anymore;” “Please share;” “Disney treats my mom like a slave;” “Be nicer to our mom and dad;” or “They don’t respect us.” The protestors walk to the Walt Disney Studios and throw their toys in front of the Mickey Mouse statue.

His Pieces (Gallop Apace)

Perhaps I was mysteriously captivated by the tales of his movements . . . Although reciting Solomon, Ondaatje, Keillor, Nash, and Poe, he remained acutely ingenious . . . The melodic voice with its high and low modulations seemed to have found sustenance on earth, yet insinuated the non-terrestrial . . . Inebriated by those words, phrases, and intervals, I managed the thought: what an enchanting performance.

Short Narrative (Epistolary)

Dear Mama Jean,

I am awake at 2:05 a.m., and it is very silent at my apartment complex. The only thing that can be heard is the dripping of water from the hose of the sink in my kitchen and the humming of the air conditioners cooling everyone's resting bones. I do have a subject at hand and a pertinent message to communicate to you through this letter. I woke up in my bed. My fan kept me cool as I stared at the ceiling or the back of my eyelids. Imperceptibly, my thoughts went from the heat to you. Probably because I never got to share with you the details of my trip with Crab or should I call him Daddy; I am not sure. I do not have an urgent message other than wanting to communicate my thoughts to you so you can have a vague picture of that trip to New York, Tennessee, and Arkansas. After being weathered by the stress of everyday at graduate school and my over-thinking, after all this great and often detrimental mental activity, my thoughts turn to you, and they nourish me with happiness and warmth, that sense of harmony in the world I rarely find.

I do not know why I always imagined him holding a job in a bus garage, but all I remember is that those illusions were soon crushed by his appearance that day in the fourth floor of our apartment. Why did he have to show up after nine years and have nothing to tell me? That is nothing, other than “I just came by to pick up Jarell.” He said it with such an ease that in turn undermined his nine years in prison. I wanted to ask him things; I had so many questions, such as have you ever thought about me? Have you thought about how I might have liked playing football, or how you could have taught me to throw a ball? Why haven’t you written? No time? I suppose. The answers to these questions were always left to my imagination. Telling him that I thought nothing of him was a lie. The term “nothingness” somehow seemed like the perfect noun to conceal my anger and in a way offend him, by implying negation. However, I felt empty afterwards, and perhaps this guilt is what caused me not to rebel against taking that trip.

My stomach was hurting, and I do not think that the pancakes over at Colonette had anything to do with it, but rather the pressuring feeling that I could not utter the phrases: “I am glad you are here,” or “I love you too Daddy,” or “I am sorry you are in pain” caused me distress. I felt a lump in my throat, and missing you was only adding to the darkness that gathered in the form of heavy clouds, forming an uneasy wandering mass in my soul. I could feel the stark contrast between you and him, separating unevenly like water and oil in a pan. At moments, I wished I had never taken the trip. I did not want to listen to his justification of killing the guard, his ongoing mumbling of the robbery, and even more so—about Rydell. I missed the feeling of the warm hand on my shoulder, pressing in . . . your hand, your approach of never telling me what to do. Well, telling me, but in a different way. Crab was not telling; he was stating.

I hated Frank. I never told you about him because he intimidated me. Actually, now that I recollect, I did not hate him. I hated what he shared with him, with my father. They spoke as if they had some things in common. It was not even the speaking, as much as Crab smiling at Frank, as if being proud of his manliness and abilities in the boxing matches. I wanted him to teach me things . . . anything. But he did not. He only stated. That one conversation in regards to me beating Frank, I remember clearly, Crab’s assertions being different, ornamented with a smirk on his face. Every time that smile appeared and vanished, it took away some particle of the accumulated darkness, sitting heavy right here, in my soul. After, the trip was not so dreadful anymore, and the feeling of strangeness did not make itself known as much. He respected me . . . me—the fourteen-year-old boy he met a few days ago. He told me he “needed to look in a mirror and see something he could respect.” I never responded to this specific notion. I was angry at him. I was tired of his mentioning of the endless “I.” “I need.” “I need.” “I need.” When was the time to incorporate Jarell in the picture—in the dark picture painted on a torn and old canvas?

Nonetheless, I felt his pain. Perhaps I was selfish too in a way. Perhaps I got him aspirin because I desperately wanted him to get better, in order for him not to abandon me in the middle of nowhere. Something changed. Without much thought, I started showing interest in his stories, asking him about his mother (or should I say my grandmother), his father, and his life in Forest. I realized that the tears I shed were not because of my confused, yet current state, but they were for him, for his serious illness. I cared for him. In that Blue Bar I did not want to hear his justifications and Rydell’s approvals, not because I did not believe him, but because I did not care of those justifications. I trusted him regardless. One way to make a person trustworthy is to trust him, right?

Never have I been scared of losing someone, but I was that day. The pictures of Crab heaving by leaning to the light pole, struggling to put his hands behind his head in order not to get shot, appear reel after reel in my mind. It was then, when I called him “Daddy;” and even more importantly, it was then when I forgave him. After the funeral, I felt sad but not empty. We shared things.

Jarell

Virginity-loss: Contemporary

To anticipate the main empirical findings reported in Laura M. Carpenter’s article, “Gender and the Meaning and Experience of Virginity Loss in the Contemporary United States,” there might be something for everyone. Whether one views virginity as a gift, a stigma, or a process, these aspects still shape the individual’s identity.

It might be true that gender may be diminishing in importance as a determinant of sexual meanings and experiences, according to the study, yet there is sexual agency exercised in many relationships, where one partner disempowers the other. On this issue, I think, feelings run strong. Within the adolescent world, it is the rhetoric of romantic love that provides boys with the key cultural mechanism by which they “get a yes” from girls. Why this behavior? Most male participants in the study associate virginity with stigma. So virginity as a stigma, for men, is also a disempowerment for them. This explains the key cultural mechanism and the pressure coming from adolescent boys. It also shows the relationship between gender and virginity loss being more complex.

The interpretation of virginity as a gift by most women (participants) portrays a cautious approach to the idea. Most women were amply rewarded, or just had the experience of reciprocity (“gift” exchange was fair). In other cases, there are dissatisfying virginity-loss encounters, where there is a nonreciprocating partner who does not “participate” in gift-exchange, but rather treats the situation as a casual encounter. Here, the lifelong view of virginity as a gift gets lost, and what remains is a person who has a missed, romantic experience once dreamed of. On the other hand, in the absence of social control and labels, adolescents are more susceptible to engaging in nonnormative, “enjoyable” behavior or heightening the cost of such behavior.

Some may argue that interpreting virginity as a gift does not make one gain or lose self-esteem, suddenly join sports teams, do better in school, have better relations with his parents, or become less or more attractive. It just simply means delaying intercourse. However, others may argue that delaying intercourse is a way to stress moral systems that justify saying “no thank you” to sex. Are we seeing a new subculture emerged in which it is “cool” to say no to sex? What happens when celebrities such as Leonardo DiCaprio in several accounts shout to the interviewer: “Virginity is hot!”? Perhaps virginity does not disempower women, as the study suggests, and maybe gender is not losing salience as an aspect of identity shaping.

On the other hand, there is the interpretation of virginity loss as a step in process, which the study shows does not disempower neither males nor females, but rather enhances one’s knowledge about sex, albeit with a partner’s assistance. There seem to be no psychological downsides to this interpretation—virginity loss as a process. Nonetheless, I believe this might be true mostly for adults who are more perceptible to viewing virginity-loss as an empowering and health-enhancing experience.

Work Cited

Carpenter, Laura M. “Gender and the Meaning and Experience of Virginity Loss in the Contemporary United States.” Gender and Society 16.3 (2002): 345-65. Print.

Linguistics--The Sign

Although it is clear that structuralism, as a literary movement is unthinkable without Ferdinand de Saussure, his linguistic argument is difficult to assess. One of the main insights of Saussure’s essay is the arbitrary bond between the signifier and the signified. It is clear that Saussure’s “signifieds” are particles cut from the jumble of thought, which makes the attempt to decipher the relation of the mind to an extrinsic reality to be Saussure’s main goal.

Furthermore, one must understand that the emphasis here is on the reciprocal nature of the sign, which is split into two parts: a signifier and the signified. As he asserts, “The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound-image” (Saussure 852). Sign, in this case, is not just a name for a thing, but a complicated entirety that links a “sound-image” and a “concept.” Saussure labels in the Course in General Linguistics, the former to be the signifier, and the latter—the signified. For instance, we have the concept of a car in our mind, but what we also have, is the word “car” which brings about the sound-image. If we think of a car, the form of it or the concept, we also, immediately think of that concept as the “car.” This seems like a standard explanation, in which the “car” for which “car” stands for is presumably the concept of car only, but one does wonder about the reference to the things to which words have no natural relationship. Do things exist outside the mind?

Another ambiguity that comes across while deciphering the text is whether or not a language makes the distiction directly, can also make it indirectly or completely ignore it. Discussion of differences between words in different languages, between synonyms in the same language, between words that are incommensurable or are antonyms, rely ultimately on sense verification in the real world. Certainly, it is true that one may not notice details in a perceived scene for which one has not been prepared by language, but as interesting as this may seem, it is insignificant alongside the inability to avoid certain sensations whether one has language for them or not. For instance, an experience like a headache does not depend on the existence of a signifier.

“So what?” I ask myself. We never get it quite right, and there are no definite outlines. There is nothing novel in recognizing the incongruence of language.

Work Cited

Saussure, Ferdinand. “From Course in General Linguistics.” The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism. Ed. Vincent B. Leitch. 2nd ed. W.W. Norton & Company Inc.: New York, 2001. 850-66. Print.

Karl Popper--Falsification (Philosophy of Science)

As Popper notes it, “every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or to refute it.” [1] Popper’s continual conjectures and refutations clearly deny any induction as part of scientific method. This is not an entirely jointed theory, yet it makes sense. Popper is not trying to exonerate induction in the scientific method; rather he completely eliminates it while he clarifies the scientific method: “Popper, then, repudiates induction, and rejects the view that it is the characteristic method of scientific investigation and inference and substitutes falsifiability in its place.” [2] He believes that theories are always falsified at a later date. Moreover, he argues that “theories [Marx’s, Freud’s, or Adler’s] appeared to be able to explain practically everything that happened within the fields to which they referred.” [3] But this, in his opinion, is not enough for them to be called genuine. Popper thinks that in every step of the way, these theories find verifications and this in fact, is their weakness. He calls these theories “non-scientific” because they are not disproved or proven erroneous: “A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory but a vice.” [4] On the other hand, scientists might argue that the best scientific theories are the ones that have multifarious verifications and confirmations. Maybe there are no vehement validations or verifications in science but there are some confirmations. In this essay, I will argue that Popper’s theory of falsification is tenable and is skillfully evasive; it is not another hollow conception of disproving theories but a genuine argument against verification.

We are getting closer to the truth as Popper asserts, but what is the so-called truth? How are we getting closer to the truth? At this instant Popper presents his idea of falsifiability. Popper’s notion of verisimilitude is a somewhat hazy and entertaining conception, yet when viewed with care it makes more sense and supports falsification. As noted in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Popper argues that “A ‘good’ scientific theory has a higher level of verisimilitude than its rivals, and he explicated this concept by reference to the logical consequences of theories.” [5] This idea mirrors the mutations in the standards, contrary to which we appraise the feats of the past. Popper’s definition of verisimilitude seems to necessitate the habitual pertinence of mathematical and valid (logical) systematic procedures, which are for many scientists the paragons of external reality. The idea of verisimilitude is not an objective idea; however, general notions of verisimilitude are suitable in scientific applications because they, in fact, raise the applications’ genuine status by hiding assessed aims, concealing themselves in the shadows of antecedent operations. Social sciences are well-acquainted with this plight when innate evaluations are conceded to disguise the end results of logical or mathematical computations. If supposed that verisimilitude of scientific theories are deliberated plainly by a collection of comprehensible genuine outcomes rather by a collection of false outcomes, then any given scientist could augment the verisimilitude in his theories in every step of the way and assumingly innovate science by heedlessly iterating the experiments that are only “corroborated.”

Popper’s critique of Karl Marx’s theory of history, as its “predictions were testable, and in fact falsified.” He argues that the theory is weak because most of the time it was confirmed. [6] What makes it falsifiable? Moreover, Popper asserts that the theory is saved by ad hoc, and “in this way they rescued the theory from refutation.” [7] Likely, Popper is correct. Today, capitalism has expanded the impoverishes of the class of workers and the exploited so quickly that they are strained to make changes and revolutions just to stay alive. These social classes are perpetually positioned in opposition to each other, and the classes are inclined to preponderate; whose standards would be met maximally within the claims of production. Popper argues that Marx’s theory of history is not scientific; moreover, it is scientific only by moral excellence of the determinism of its phantasm. It inclines to ascribe societal mutations to the active directions of social construction.

An example of a theory that has been falsified, which confirms Popper’s falsification, is Kepler’s laws. His three planetary laws state that “every planet travels round the sun in an elliptical orbit, with the sun at one focus. The moon, in the same way, travels in an ellipse round the earth, though in this case he recognized that the ellipse was not perfect.” [8] It is not to oppose that Kepler’s law of planetary motion is not an astounding discovery, yet the laws are proven to be factually erroneous. Kepler’s second law asserts, “The velocity of a planet varies with its distance from the sun in such a way that a line joining the planet with the sun sweeps out equal areas in equal times.” [9] These laws are mere approximations and the uncovering of Kepler’s principles and regulations established a requisite step in an advocating research of science that preceded generously confirmed Newton’s theory from which an altered version of the Kepler’s laws was attained. Kepler’s third law states that “The square of the time taken by any planet to make a complete orbit is proportional to the cube of its mean distance from the sun.” [10] A discovery of untenable principles such as Kepler’s come out to be important in the scientific progress, yet they are still falsified, confirming Popper’s notion of falsification. Popper might assert that theories like this one may have some confirmations or truth content, yet it is not falsified at a later date. It seems like the theory was like creating a mirage, which is illusionary, a fake.

A true theory aggregates to the acquiring of a novel entry of noesis, not just coming across with a fresh target without distinguishing that phenomenon or understanding its importance. Kepler has not realized what he had discovered. Later his theories have been falsified by Newton in regards to the planetary system. Kepler’s first two laws were results of mere observations. “Kepler regarded them as mathematically equivalent, although in fact they are not; the inverse distance law is a good approximation for ellipses of small eccentricity, but is not exact.” [11] It is clear that Newton might have derived from Kepler’s laws to come up with his theory; however, he does not seem to have relied on Kepler’s laws for an explicit empirical substance. When ellipse was accepted by many astronomers, Newton did not identify that the pragmatic ascertainment did not give assurance of an elliptical model. This makes it prominent that Newton falsified Kepler’s laws, which proves Popper’s falsification as genuine. “[Some astronomers] who accepted Kepler's first law with enthusiasm, nevertheless rejected the second and substituted some simpler but less accurate alternative.” [12] They rejected it because the falsity content is higher than the truth content is lower. It is the opposite of verisimilitude.

On Kepler’s first law Newton is considering the area law, utilized to the principal planets merely as a very estimative empirical content. “Newton showed that the area law was derivable from a much simpler and more ultimate set of exact mathematical laws. Even those who accepted the area law in principle often used simpler but less accurate variants in practice.” [13] Newton is not affirming a fixed pragmatic verification of the area rule by Kepler or any scientist, but instead he is requesting us to view the planetary system in a universal and qualitative mode. Newton’s laws are utilized to attain derivative equations for the shifted magnitude and direction from the sun to for instance, Venus or any planet. Then it is displayed that the shifted magnitude and direction are sited in a plane for instance, if the base end is moved without rotation to the point of derivation; the base point sums up the elements as an ellipse.

As Newton states, the number Kepler gives in his Rudolphine Tables for the mean radius of Saturn's orbit, namely 9.51 semidiame-ters of the Earth's orbit, is smaller than the third Keplerian rule would require; with the commonly accepted values for the Earth's and Saturn's periods, the number should be more nearly 9.54. Newton suggests that the error may derive from Jupiter's action on Saturn, and he further gives a rough estimate of the effect he expects.[14]

It is an instant effect of Newton’s laws that the middle point of two entities with their

gravity may succor as the root of an inertial coordinate system. Kepler’s laws do not apply Newton’s Laws or vice versa. Newton did not rely on Kepler’s laws to come up with his Laws. Nevertheless, he falsified Kepler’s laws in his reasoning. Newton’s onset point was the dynamical laws engaging influences of cosmic bodies that decide the orbits of planets. Newton’s theories are different than of Kepler’s laws. Kepler’s determine that if anyone has such laws then it is of great certainty. Popper, here, would argue that this kind of verification is what makes that theory weak or even he might call it “non-scientific.” These kinds of confirmations are what make a theory not genuine: “ Every genuine test of a scientific theory, then, is logically an attempt to refute or to falsify it, and one genuine counter-instance falsifies the whole theory.” [15] Moreover, Popper thinks that theories that put themselves at a greater risk of being refuted are genuine.

Popper’s notion of falsification is tenable at every instance because what makes sense in this paradigm will not be sane in another. As Dr. McHenry puts it, “Verification of scientific knowledge is replaced by falsification. Accumulation of irrefutable facts is replaced by conjecture and refutation.” [16] If there is truth content in a theory, Popper asserts, it has to be marked as false. It is easy to obtain confirmations and verification, says Popper, looking for verifications will work at best if theories are found as mistaken and later replaced by “better” ones. Kepler when introduced his first law, then the third; he applied some modifications later. Kepler, himself, at some point falsified his own theories, proving Popper’s falsification notion. The acceptance of a new thesis lies in the idea whether or not it can e confirmed successfully having steady empirical grounds. The interest for Popper is not so much in confirming a theory; rather falsifying it. Popper’s theory of falsification is very much compatible with actual scientific practice. Nevertheless, is prone to serious questioning especially by physicists. Regarding the basis of the falsification measure by Popper; it is furnished on the proposal that general laws are epistemologically obscure in the consideration of the enigma of inductive illation. A neat give-and take on a scientific theory will seek to show that the conception of scientific theory as interpreted by a physicist, for instance, is at divergence with that articulated by Popper. Popper argues that general (universal) notions are not forthright accounts because they cannot be logically vindicated. Yet they may be genuinely falsified. Popper brings up a seemingly perfect example to justify his approach:

The empirical basis of objective science has thus nothing ‘absolute’ about it. Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or ‘given’ base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being. (qtd. in McHenry)

Popper’s “customary” approach is what makes him distinguishable among other philosophers. His one idea-the idea of falsification is a genuine statement.

Bibliography

McHenry, Leemon. “Popper and Maxwell on Scientific Progress,”

<http://www.csun.edu/~lmchenry/PopperandMaxwellonScientificProgress.html>.

Popper, Karl R. “Science: Conjectures and Refutations,” Readings in the Philosophy of

Science, edited by Theodore Schick, Jr., 9-13. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Company, 2000.

Thomton, Stephen. "Karl Popper", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

.

Russell, J.L. “Kepler’s Laws of Planetary Motion: 1609-1666.” The British Journal for

the History of Science. Vol. 2, No. 1 (Jun., 1964): 1-24.

Wilson, Curtis “Newton and Some Philosopher’s on Kepler’s ‘Laws,” Journal of

the History of Ideas. Vol. 35, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1974): 231-258.

---

[1] Karl R. Popper, “Science: Conjectures and Refutations,” Readings in the Philosophy of Science (Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Company, 2000), 11.

[2] Stephen Thomton, "Karl Popper", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .

[3]Karl R. Popper, “Science: Conjectures and Refutations,” 10.

[4] Karl R. Popper, “Science: Conjectures and Refutations,” 10.

[5] Stephen Thomton, "Karl Popper", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .

[6] Karl R. Popper, “Science: Conjectures and Refutations,” 12.

[7] Karl R. Popper, “Science: Conjectures and Refutations,” 12.

[8] J. L. Russell, “Kepler’s Laws of Planetary Motion: 1609-1666”, The British Journal for the History of Science, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Jun., 1964): 2.

[9] J. L. Russell, “Kepler’s Laws of Planetary Motion,” 2.

[10] J. L. Russell, “Kepler’s Laws of Planetary Motion,” 2.

[11] J. L. Russell, “Kepler’s Laws of Planetary Motion,” 3.

[12] J. L. Russell, “Kepler’s Laws of Planetary Motion,” 3.

[13] J. L.”Russell, Kepler’s Laws of Planetary Motion,” 3-4.

[14] Curtis Wilson, “Newton and Some Philosopher’s on Kepler’s ‘Laws,” Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1974): 231.

[15] Stephen Thomton, "Karl Popper", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .

[16] Leemon McHenry, “Popper and Maxwell on Scientific Porgress,” < http://www.csun.edu/~lmchenry/PopperandMaxwellonScientificProgress.html>.

The Concept of the Other

At first glance, Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex might seem rationalistic, old-fashioned-modernist, and above all—male biased. Should this work be valued only for historical reasons: feminists ought to become more aware of their historical milieu? If the answer is yes, then the work should be dismissed for its outdated ideas. Nonetheless, a rationalistic approach will examine that Beauvoir’s concept of “Self” is very much up-to-date and provides clues to some of post-modern feminist dilemmas.

Beauvoir argues as an intrinsic premise that the man has always conceived of himself as the Self (not to be confused with the Cartesian concept of “self”), the essential, and has made of woman—the Other: “In sexuality and maternity woman as subject can claim autonomy; but to be a ‘true woman’ she must accept herself as the Other” (Beauvoir 1272). In addition, it is apparent that Beauvoir utterly rejects the notion of matriarchy, taking a Levi-Straussian stand—the public and even social prerogative always belonged to men. Societies that regarded woman as Mother or Goddess, indicated that woman’s power was attested outside of the human realm. This then seems to prove the woman’s power to be somewhat “magical,” defined by man out of his needs. Unfortunately, man could eradicate that definition when it no longer served his wants and needs. Hence, the power prevailed in the hands of man.

Furthermore, Beauvoir speaks of several elements that make the oppression of woman inimitable: First, in contrast with the oppression of race and class, the oppression of woman is not a fortuitous historical fact. Moreover, it is not an occurrence in time which has sometimes been traversed or reverted. Woman has always been subordinate to man. Second, woman has interiorized the extraneous perspective that man is indeed the essential, and the woman is the inessential. A question arises: What male advantages make men succeed in the first place? The definitive answer consists of two factors: women are physically weaker than men; and women bear children. One might think that these biological facts were used in such context only in primitive times. How much has changed? In modern times, has the invention of the birth control pill (with its continuing problems/side effects) really enabled women to see the difference between sexual relations and childbearing? Contraceptives have certainly changed some perspective, but to say that they are a way in dilating women into a Self, and the problem is solved—won’t be cogent.

Work Cited

De Beauvoir, Simone. “From The Second Sex.” The Norton Anthology of Theory and

Criticism. Ed. Vincent B. Leitch. 2nd ed. W.W. Norton & Company Inc.: New

York, 2001. 1265-73. Print.